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Abstract:  Despite the social importance of awards, they have been largely 
disregarded by academic research in economics. This paper 
investigates whether a specific, yet important, award in economics, 
the John Bates Clark Medal, raises recipients’ subsequent research 
activity and status compared to a synthetic control group of non-
recipient scholars with similar previous research performance. We 
find evidence of positive incentive and status effects that raise both 
productivity and citation levels.  
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1. Introduction 
The use of awards as both an incentive and a reward is universal. Government 
systems, from monarchies to republics, democracies to dictatorships, bestow 
awards to honor outstanding people. Besides the well-known state orders and 
medals, there is a plethora of additional awards, including prizes, titles, and 
decorations. Their bestowal has a long history, dating back to at least the 
Greek drama and arts competitions in sixth century BC. Of no less renown are 
the medieval architecture competitions (English 2005)1. Today, the United 
States (US) Congress and the President both bestow civilian medals, most 
notably the Congressional Gold Medal (established in 1776) and the 
Presidential Medal of Freedom (established in 1945). There is also a very 
large number of awards in the military sector; prominent examples being the 
Purple Heart and the Bronze and Silver Stars (Cowen, 2000: 93). Former 
communist countries, most notably the Soviet Union and the German 
Democratic Republic, are known for the abundance of orders (such as the 
Order of the Badge of Honor), medals, and titles (for instance, Mother 
Heroine), which their leaders bestowed on their citizens. Beyond politics, 
                                                
1 A good example can be found in Bramly’s biography on Leonardo da Vinci. Leonardo was 
keen to make the bronze cathedral doors of Piacenza Cathedral. A document draft letter left by 
Leonardo written in the third person has led to speculations “whether he was not writing his 
own name but rather counting on some influential acquaintance to sign and send the letter on 
his behalf—not a very honest tactic, but a common one at the time, and employed here with 
some humor” (Bramly, 1988: 250). The letter starts with “Magnificent commissioners of the 
works, having learned that Your Excellencies have decided to erect certain great works in 
bronze, I propose to offer you some advice about this. First of all, take care not to entrust the 
commission so hastily as to fail to make a good choice both of master and subject. I cannot 
help feeling some irritation when I think of the individuals who have conveyed to you their 
desire to embark on such an enterprise without bothering to ascertain whether they are really 
capable of doing it, to say the least. One is a potter, another an armorer, a third is a bell 
founder and another a maker of bell clappers; there is even a bombardier among them…Open 
your eyes and try to assure yourself that your money will not serve to buy your own shame” 
(pp. 250-251). The letter then ends: “No one is qualified – believe me – apart from Leonardo 
the Florentine, who is now making Duke Francesco’s bronze horse, and whom one need not 
suggest, since he has enough work for a lifetime; and I even doubt, so huge is his enterprise, 
that he will ever finish it” (p. 251). Bramly then notes that Leonardo was dissatisfied with the 
end and rewrote it: “There is the man his lordship called from Florence to do this work, who is 
a worthy master, but he has so much to do that he will never finish it” (p. 251). 
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awards also assume a central role in the arts, culture, sports, and the media2. 
Prominent examples can be found in film (the Academy Awards), music (the 
Grammy Awards), and in literature (the Booker Prize, the Prix Goncourt, and 
the Pulitzer Prize). 
Even in the corporate sector, where the only valid currency is 
supposedly money, much importance is attached to titles, such as Manager of 
the Year (Bielby and Baron, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Wade et al., 
2006), and many companies use formal recognition programs to honor their 
most valued employees (see, e.g., Magnus, 1981; Nelson, 2005). Academies 
and scientific institutions equally rely on a differentiated and extensive system 
of awards, with titles such as honorary doctor or senator. Most renowned are 
the Nobel Prizes (see Mazloumian et al., 2011) and the Fields Medal in 
mathematics. Many prestigious fellowships exist in scientific societies (e.g., in 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences or in the Econometric Society3). 
Each year, the American Economic Association (AEA) elects Distinguished 
Fellows, as well as Foreign Honorary Members. It also recognizes a Best 
Paper Award for papers published in each of the four Association Journals 
(Applied, Economic Policy, Macro, and Micro).  
Moreover, the American Economic Association awards the John Bates 
Clark Medal to a scholar under the age of 40 "who is judged to have made the 
most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge." The John 
Bates Clark Medal was awarded biennially from 1947 to 2009, and annually 
from 2010 onwards. Many of its recipients go on to become Nobel Laureates. 
Of the 34 scholars who have been honored with the Clark Medal, 12 have 
subsequently won the Nobel Prize.  
The social importance of such awards notwithstanding, academic 
research (outside the field of history) has largely disregarded them; partly, 
perhaps, because their infungibility raises doubts about their motivational 
                                                
2 See, for example, Ginsburgh and van Ours (2003), Holden (1993), Levy (1987). 
3 See the analysis by Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003) on the determinants of Econometric 
Society Fellowship elections. 
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efficacy compared to such superior incentives as monetary compensation 
(Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). 
Likewise, the fact that they cannot be consumed might make them of little 
interest to recipients, which would imply that they do not actually lead to 
superior performance. Another possible reason for the neglect is that awards 
could be valued merely for the increased future earnings they induce. For 
example, in the entertainment industry, Oscar recipients profit from large 
increases in their subsequent incomes (Nelson et al., 2001). However, there is 
research suggesting that the value of awards goes over and above the 
monetary benefits. As has been shown, individuals value status and are willing 
to give up financial gain to obtain it (Huberman, Loch and Öncüler, 2004). 
They accord value to awards as producers of status.  
This paper explores the above-mentioned possibilities by focusing on a 
specific yet important award, the John Bates Clark Medal. It compares award 
recipients (the treatment group) to a control group of non-recipient scholars 
with similar previous research performance. The paper assess whether the 
award subsequently raises research activity and benefits the beholder via 
increased professional status by measuring publications and citations of 
publications that were published before the award conferral. Most particularly, 
by constructing a synthetic group of economists, we are able to distinguish 
whether the bestowal of the Clark Medal simply reflects the past activity of 
particularly gifted young economists or whether it also raises productivity 
thereafter. We find that the latter is indeed the case—and to a considerable 
degree. We also explore a status or “Matthew” effect—the phenomenon that 
success breeds success—referenced in Merton’s observations of a 
“misallocation of credit for scientific work […and the] accruing of greater 
increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of 
considerable repute” (Merton, 1973: 445–446). We find that the John Bates 
Clark Medal heightens the visibility of articles published by its recipients. For 
Clark medalists, each article published before receiving the medal 
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subsequently draws more citations compared to articles published by scholars 
in the synthetic control group of non-recipients. Based on these results, we 
conclude that awards in general may have both a positive productivity and a 
status effect.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses 
the existing literature on awards, Section 3 outlines the empirical research 
strategy, and Section 4 describes the data and the construction of the synthetic 
group of non-recipient economists. Section 5 then reports the econometric 
estimates, followed by a robustness check in Section 6. Section 7 presents our 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Relevant Awards Literature 
The existing literature on awards is extensive (see Frey, 2005). However, most 
of it focuses on a descriptive approach to particular honors, for instance the 
Order of the Garter (Begent and Chesshyre, 1999) or the Order of Merit 
(Martin, 2007). Phillips (2004) and the Report of the House of Commons 
(2004) provide ample discussion and some data on orders in Great Britain. 
Specific aspects of awards in the arts and culture are analyzed in Ginsburgh 
(2003, 2005) and Simonton (2004), dealing for instance with the Academy 
Awards (Oscars) in film, the Booker Prize in literature, and the Eurovision 
Song Contest. Ginsburgh and Van Ours (2003), and Glejser and Heyndels 
(2001) study the Queen Elisabeth Music Competition, one of the most 
important international competitions in classical music. In the field of science, 
Coupé (2013) analyzes best paper prizes given by economics and finance 
journals. Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003) study the determinants of 
Econometric Society Fellowship elections. Assessments of the more general 
phenomenon of awards can be found in sociology (e.g., Bourdieu, 1979; 
Braudy, 1986; Elster, 1983; or Walzer, 1983). 
With the exception of the path-breaking contribution by Hansen and 
Weisbrod (1972) and the few studies referenced above, economists have 
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largely neglected awards as a research topic. Among the few who have since 
followed suit are Besley (2005), Frey (2006, 2007), Frey and Gallus (2013), 
Gavrila et al. (2005), Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011), Malmendier and Tate 
(2009), and Neckermann, Cueni and Frey (2012). Some economists have 
studied related issues—examples are Akerlof (1976) on reputation; Frank 
(1985), Frank and Cook (1995), and Scitovsky (1976) on positional goods; 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (2001) on incentives; and Auriol and Renault (2008) on 
social status. Closely related, albeit not emanating from the field of 
economics, is the work by Brennan and Pettit (2004) on esteem. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
The central aims of this paper are to assess the effect on work performance of 
receiving or anticipating the John Bates Clark Medal, and to evaluate how this 
award affects future (citation) success. Academia provides an especially 
fruitful real-world laboratory setting for analyzing status shocks because of 
three characteristics: First, it is easy to distinguish between individual 
producers (scientists) and their products (scientific articles); second, the flow 
of citations serves as a metric for status effects; and third, status shocks take 
the form of prizes/awards (Azoulay, Stuart, and Wang, 2011: 9–10). The John 
Bates Clark Medal, specifically, provides early recognition and status that 
could enhance self-confidence and thus post-award publication performance. 
Merton, for example, refers to Thomas Henry Huxley’s apparent doubts about 
his own capacities: “the only use of honors is as an antidote to such fits of the 
‘blue devils’… there are times when grave doubts overshadow my mind, and 
then such testimony as this restores my self-confidence” (Merton, 1973: 437). 
He also cites Czeslaw Milosz’s argument that “[h]onorific awards should not 
be regarded only psychologically … as providing incentives for excellent 
work. They also serve a social function, by testifying to the merit of kinds of 
excellence that might otherwise be regarded as having small significance in 
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society. Recognition may counter tendencies of the intellectual to feel himself 
alienated from his society” (Merton, 1973: 438).  
More recent studies use experimental approaches to study awards as 
incentive mechanisms in order to handle causality issues. Kosfeld and 
Neckermann (2011), for example, gauge the effect of symbolic awards on 
work performance by studying the work performance of students in an 
international non-governmental organization who are exposed to a social 
recognition environment in which the best performing student receives a non-
monetary award. On average, the work performance of the treatment group 
(recipients) is 12% higher than that of the control group (non-recipients). By 
using students, a relatively homogeneous group of subjects, the authors are 
able to show that symbolic awards provide an incentive for students to put in 
more work effort. In the same vein, Neckermann, Cueni, and Frey (2012) use 
2004 to 2007 work performance rating data of 155 credit card service call 
centre agents to assess the effect of a non-performance based award on 
winners’ ex-post performance. They find that the award produces short-term 
performance enhancement in both the winners and their work group. In an 
earlier study, Markham, Scott, and McKee (2002) use work attendance data 
for 1,110 workers in four garment factories to compare attendance rates at a 
factory that has a social recognition program with that of another plant with no 
such intervention. They find that work attendance is higher in the presence of 
social recognition programs that publicly praise employees with perfect 
attendance records. 
In our study, however, the quasi-natural experiment using the John 
Bates Clark Medal recipients as the treatment group makes it more difficult to 
identify any causal effect. That is, having been judged as having higher 
performance than other researchers, award recipients are a highly selected 
group (i.e., superstars), meaning that the non-random assignment of the 
treatment group may raise such issues as treatment/control group 
comparability. Hence, to build a control group of non-recipient researchers 
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with similar profiles (i.e., similar publication and citation performance), we 
employ the data-driven statistical method that Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 
developed to construct a synthetic control region for estimating the economic 
cost of the terrorist conflict in Spain’s Basque Country. In their model, the 
counterfactuality is a weighted combination of other Spanish regions whose 
relevant economic variables are closest to those of the Basque Country before 
the outset of terrorist activity. Since then, other studies have used the synthetic 
control method to assess the effect of a policy intervention or economic shock. 
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), for example, analyze the effect of 
a tobacco control program on tobacco consumption in California by using 
other states to create a “synthetic California.” Likewise, Campos and 
Kinoshita (2010) and Sanso-Navarro (2011) adopt the same technique to 
investigate the effect of the structural reforms in Russia and Argentina, and of 
the United Kingdom (UK) not adopting the Euro on foreign direct investment 
inflow, respectively. Cavallo et al. (2010) apply the method in a cross-country 
study to estimate the economic cost of a natural disaster, while other studies 
employ it to assess the effect of terrorism or crime (Abadie and Diamond, 
2008; Montalvo, 2011; Nilakantan and Singhal, 2012; Pinotti, 2011) or of 
macro-policy interventions on economic growth (Abadie, Diamond, and 
Hainmueller, 2012; Billmeier and Nannicini, 2011; Dhungana, 2011; Liou and 
Musgrave, 2012).  
We exploit this synthetic control method to select a suitable control 
group for the John Bates Clark Medal recipients and to assess the effect of this 
award on research productivity and status. The aim is to select a counterfactual 
group of non-recipient economists who share similar time-invariant academic 
characteristics and a similar ex-ante research output (i.e., before the winner 
receives the award). To this end, we first derive the individual academic 
lifecycle performance for all researchers across both publications and 
citations. We then use the synthetic control method to choose a group of 
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researchers, such that their weighted combination is as close  as possible to the 
ex-ante performance of the John Bates Clark medalists (JBCM). 
Such an approach is also used in a recent study by Azoulay, Stuart, and 
Wang (2011), who assess the effect of status changes on researchers’ citation 
performance. More specifically, they look at the event of life scientists’ 
appointment as investigators at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI), 
a highly regarded institution in the biomedical research field whose selection 
committee consists mostly of National Academy of Sciences members. They 
exploit the effect of this positive status shock on post-appointment citation 
performance by using coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus, King, and 
Porro, 2011), a non-parametric matching method, to select articles with similar 
citation trajectories and then compare those published by HHMI investigators 
before their appointment with those written by other high-quality, but non-
appointed, scientists. The CEM method identifies potential control articles 
based on the following shared characteristics with the HHMI papers: (1) year 
of publication, (2) journal, (3) number of authors, (4) author position in the 
authorship list, and (5) cumulative number of citations to the article before the 
HHMI appointment. The control article is selected if the sum of squared 
differences in citation counts between the treated and control articles from the 
year of publication until the year before appointment is minimized. They find 
evidence of a moderate post-appointment citation boost on HHMI articles 
published before the appointment. They also observe a very slight increase in 
the citation rate in the first year after the appointment with a gradual decrease 
over subsequent years.  
Similar to that of Azoulay, Stuart, and Wang (2011), our control group 
selection relies on how closely the trajectories of the overall number of 
publications or citations between JBCM and the control group are matched 
before the medal is awarded. There are, however, three notable differences 
between their study and ours: First, instead of using article-level data, we 
focus on the researcher level by looking not only at a status effect via citations 
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but also at work productivity; second, whereas their HHMI subfields are quite 
broad, our group of economists is relatively homogeneous; and third, we use a 
weighted combination of a few researchers, thereby ensuring that the control 
group has the closest match to the treatment group. We construct one control 
group for each JBCM. Once the entire control group is chosen, we present a 
set of graphs on publication output and citation success for the JBCM group 
versus the “synthetic” non-medalist group, and compare their academic 
lifecycle performance in the post-award period. If the performance trajectory 
of JBCM deviates from the counterfactuals, we conjecture that such 
differences are due to the effect of receiving the Clark Medal. 
 
4. Synthetic Group: Data and Construction 
A. Publication and Citation Data 
Our goal is to use the publication and citation lifecycle profiles of researchers 
to create a dataset of elite economists and choose the most similar possible 
control group for the JBCM. To do so, we rely on the publication content data 
of the top 23 economics and finance journals listed on the Web of Science, an 
online academic citation index (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the founding 
year and publication statistics for each journal). We decided on which journals 
to include based on the journal rankings given in Conley et al. (forthcoming), 
Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos (2011), Koczy and Strobel (2010), 
Kodrzycki and Yu (2006), Liebowitz and Palmer (1984), Palacios-Huerta and 
Volij (2004), and Ritzberger (2008) for the top 23 economics and finance 
journals. Each journal selected appears at least once in the top 10 position of 
any ranking (see Table A2 in the Appendix), with American Economic Review 
(AER), Econometrica, and the Journal of Political Economy (JPE) ranking 
highest four times, twice, and once, respectively (given a weight of 1 in these 
cases). Other journals are assigned a value smaller than 1, expressed as a 
fraction of the highest-quality journal. We then use the average ranking value 
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of all the journals' reported rankings as a quality adjustment index (see Table 
A3 in the Appendix for the details of these ranking methods). 
To capture all publications by both the JBCM and the potential control 
group, we record the publication and yearly citation information on articles 
available in the selected journals up until December 20114. The dataset 
developed consists of 26,523 unique researchers and 59,690 journal articles, of 
which 1,321 are published by the 34 JBCM. Correctly identifying all 
publications for a unique researcher, however, is challenging5, so we also 
conducted a search on the scholars' academic backgrounds. One important 
criterion for constructing a suitable control group of JBCM is to control for the 
quality of the education received. We therefore used the rankings of 
economics departments cited in Coupé (2003) to identify economists who 
received their doctoral degrees at institutions similar to, or the same as, those 
of the medalists. These data are obtained from various sources: ProQuest 
Dissertations & Theses (PQDT), researchers’ curricula vitaes, university 
records, and Google searches. When we limit our analysis using the PhD 
ranking information, the number of researchers drops to 10,093. On the one 
hand, by imposing this limitation, we effectively exclude most researchers 
who are based outside the US and who might have a similar publication 
profile as the JBCM. On the other hand, introducing the PhD ranking 
information increases the comparability between the treatment and control 
                                                
4 These data were obtained between February and May 2012, and exclude publication and 
citation records after December 2011. The publication information dataset includes title, 
volume, issue, beginning and ending page numbers, the list of authors, their corresponding 
author position, and the type of publication activity. We do not exclude self-citations, but do 
exclude book reviews, and conference and proceedings papers, as well as post-publication 
activity, such as comments, replies, and corrections. 
5 This difficulty depends on the commonness of the researcher’s name and the consistency of 
his or her publication name across journals over time. We unify researchers’ publication 
names by the similarity of the authors’ first and middle name (e.g., same initials, allowing for 
spelling mistakes) in entries that share the same surname. To avoid false unification, we 
carefully separate two distinct researchers if they share the same surname but are linked to 
two distinct publication distributions more than ten years apart. We also verify manually 
whether the two groups of articles were written by two researchers under the same name or 
whether the researcher shortened his or her first name (e.g., Dan and Daniel, Dave and David, 
or Ben and Benjamin). 
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groups. Hence, we follow the rule that, unless there is a substantial 
improvement in the fitting or the pre-treatment variables, we always choose to 
impose the PhD ranking criterion/limitation.  
 
B. Academic Performance Proxies 
Both the various proxies for researcher productivity—including number and 
quality of publications—and citations as a quality proxy (Blair, Cottle, and 
Wallace, 1986; Diamond, 1984, 1989; Hamermesh, Johnson, and Weisbrod, 
1982; Johnston, Piatti, and Torgler, forthcoming; Stigler and Friedland, 1975, 
1979; Sutter and Kocher, 2001) are widely employed as tools for evaluating 
performance (e.g., Conroy, Dusansky, Drukker, and Kildegaard, 1995; 
Hansen, Weisbrod, and Strauss, 1978; Medoff and Abraham, 1981; Tuckman 
and Leahey, 1975). Nevertheless, using citations as a proxy for quality is not 
without problems (for recent discussions, see Coupé, Ginsburgh, and Noury, 
2010, and Torgler and Piatti, 2011). For example, fields with a larger research 
population attract more citations (Arrow et al., 2011; Cole and Cole, 1971), 
and citations can be driven by fashion (van Dalen and Klamer, 2005). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that citations are highly correlated with the 
assessed quality of papers (Lindsey, 1980), and with peer ratings of eminence 
or perceived scientific significance (Albert, 1975). As already mentioned, they 
also serve as a valuable metric for evaluating the effects of status (Azoulay, 
Stuart, and Wang, 2011).  
In this paper, we evaluate researcher productivity based on the number 
of publications (quality adjusted) and impact based on citations per 
publication, controlling for the quality of the publication (obtained by dividing 
the cumulative citations by the cumulative number of publications). To control 
for co-author influence, we divide both the publication and citation counts by 
the number of authors for each article (for a discussion, see Hollis, 2001; 
Lindsey, 1980; Long and McGinnis, 1982). 
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We obtain the list of JBCM from the American Economic Association 
and then identify all publications by the 34 JBCM in the dataset. On average, 
based on the list of top journals the year before the award is announced, JBCM 
published 17.7 articles. The average time length from the medalists’ first 
publishing year (hereafter, debut year) to the year they receive the award 
(award year) is 12.53 years. The average time length from the year they 
received their PhD (PhD year) to the award year is 11.24 years except for 
Kenneth E. Boulding, who did not earn a doctorate. Three JBCM received 
their doctoral degrees from universities outside the US, two from the UK 
(Oxford University and London School of Economics), and one from the 
University of Amsterdam. Ten medalists earned their PhD from MIT and 
seven from Harvard University. The average age at which a medalist receives 
the Clark Medal is 37.6. In our analysis, however, we only focus on the first 
27 JBCM (i.e., up to 2001) in order to assess post-award performance. The list 
of the medalist is presented in Table A4 in the Appendix.  
 
C. Construction of the Synthetic Group 
The ideal method for assessing the impact of the John Bates Clark Medal on a 
researcher’s publication performance, whether in quantity (number of 
publications) or quality (citation counts), is to compare the actual Clark 
medalist to researchers who have similar ex-ante research performance. We 
therefore create a group of “synthetic” counterfactuals using a weighted 
combination of researchers that best resemble the academic lifecycle of the 
corresponding medalists before receiving the award. First, we limit our 
potential “donor” pool for the synthetic group to researchers with a similar 
academic background to the JBCM of interest. For each JBCM, we use 
researchers whose debut years are no more than five years from that of the 
JBCM. For example, according to our database, Gary S. Becker published his 
first article, “A Note on Multi-Country Trade,” in the AER in 1952. Hence, in 
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constructing his corresponding control group, we exclude researchers who 
published their first article in our selected journals before 1947 or after 1957. 
This exclusion allows us to account for potential cohort effects. We also 
impose a limitation that is based on the quality of the institution at which the 
PhD was earned, by excluding researchers who received their doctoral degrees 
from institutions that are more than three ranking positions away (above or 
below) from that of the JBCM in Coupé (2003)6. Lastly, we define two sets of 
potential donor pools for each JBCM. In the first one, we also include 
researchers who later become John Bates Clark Medalists, thereby avoiding a 
selection based on individual characteristics from ex-post information. 
However, if awards lead to an increase in productivity and status, the inclusion 
of researchers who later become Clark Medalists could result in lower-bound 
estimates. We therefore develop a second donor pool that excludes all JBCM 
from the pool. However, in this case we compare JBCM’s performance with 
that of researchers never awarded the medal. This approach could induce an 
upward bias resulting from a potential selection bias.  
If !! is the number of non-award winning potential donors of the 
synthetic group for JBCM   ! ∈ 1,… ,27, then a !!×1 weight vector  !! =!!,… ,!!! ′ defines the contribution of each researcher in constructing the 
synthetic non-medalist. To ensure no extrapolation, all weights are non-
negative and sum to one; that is, !! ≥ 0 and  !! +⋯+ !!! = 1. We 
obtain  !!∗, such that   !!∗ = argmin! !!"#,! − !!",!  !! ′ !!"#,! − !!",!  !! , 
where !!"#,! is a !×1 vector of medalist  !’s pre-award values of academic 
performance predictors (i.e., pre-award publication and citation measures), 
                                                
6 For Kenneth E. Boulding, we impose no limitations on his educational background. Always 
seven institutions have been considered. For example, for a JBCM who obtained his PhD from 
an institution with a ranking position that is less than or equal to 3, we always consider 
researchers who received their PhD in a top 7 institution. On the other hand, if a JBCM has a 
PhD from an institution ranked at position 17, we consider all researchers who received their 
PhD in institutions ranked between position 14 and 20.  
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!!",! is a !×!! matrix of the same measures for the ! corresponding potential 
donors, and ! is length of the matching period. The two vectors !!"#,! and !!",! are matched based on the same phase in their academic lifecycle such 
that ! refers to the performance of JBCM ten years preceding the year of 
award conferral. To account for the possibility that the award committee may 
have information on forthcoming articles, we include the publication 
performance of the year of award in the matching process.  
Our method differs from that used by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 
in that they include predictors other than the outcome variables and impose a 
data-driven matrix ! in the minimization equation that assigns weights to each 
predictor such that the outcome variable has the closest match. In our 
matching procedure, in contrast, we focus solely on the outcome variables in 
the pre-treatment period and use specific variables to pre-select researchers 
into the donor pool; namely, the debut year in the top journals, the year the 
PhD was obtained, and the quality of the PhD institution. 
 
5. Econometric Estimates 
We present the findings in a set of graphs that compare the average 
performance of the medalists !!"# = !!"#,!!!!!!  against that of the control 
group  !!" = !!",!!!!!! , where !!",! = !!"!!"   for ! = 1,… , ! for each 
medalist  ! ∈ 1,… ,27. Here, the timeline is adjusted so that year 0 is the award 
year (indicated with a vertical line) for all medalists. First we show the 
performance from 20 years before, and 14 years after, the award year. This 
choice of post-award years is driven by the fact that 12 JBCM have also been 
awarded the Nobel Prize; most notably, Kenneth J. Arrow, who won the Nobel 
Prize 15 years after being awarded the Clark Medal. In those cases where we 
extend the post-award period (citation analysis), the observation is dropped 
from the sample (if the JBCM won the Nobel Prize during the time frame of 
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observation). Otherwise, the citation pattern would be distorted by the status 
change induced by the Nobel Prize. 
A. Cumulative Publication Counts 
Figure 1 compares the average cumulative publication numbers for JBCM 
versus the two synthetic control groups (SC)7. The dashed line (Synthetic 
Control Group 1) represents the synthetic control group from the potential 
donor pool that includes researchers who later become JBCM, while the 
dotted line (Synthetic  Control Group 2) shows the performance of the control 
group that excludes any JBCM. Both approaches produce a similar gap 
between the synthetic group and the JBCM. For simplicity, we report the 
values of the former (Synthetic Control Group 1). It should be noted that in 
our case the synthetic control method uses, on average, 4.59 researchers (SD= 
2.14) to construct the control group for each medalist. For instance, in the 
synthetic control group for Andrei Shleifer (who was awarded the Medal in 
1999 and is therefore one of the most recent entries in our data set) comprises 
7 distinguished economists in his synthetic group. Table A5 lists the names 
and the corresponding weights for each researcher. Moreover, in Figure B1 we 
show the publication performance of Andrei Shleifer and his synthetic group.  
In the post-award period considered, medalists publish on average 0.39 
weighted articles each year, which is 1.72 times more than the synthetic 
control group (0.22). Hence, five years after the award, JBCM, on average, 
achieve 10.80 weighted publications, which is 1.92 more than the synthetic 
control group's 8.88 weighted publications. This difference between treatment 
and control group grows to 2.46 weighted publications ten years after award 
                                                
7 The control groups are chosen in such a way that the pre-award cumulative number of 
publication counts and the debut year are closest to the Clark medalists. We impose no 
limitation on PhD rankings because relaxing it produces more closely matched pre-award 
publication counts between the treatment and control group. For more recent Clark 
medalists—for example, 2001 winner Matthew Rabin—we observe only ten years of post-
award performance (2001–2011), and only compare the medalist’s performance with that of 
the corresponding control group if both have the same number of observable years. Because 
JBCM share the last observable year with their corresponding synthetic control group, the 
results are less influenced by observational dropouts. 
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conferral, when JBCM and the synthetic control group have on average 
published 12.45 and 9.99 weighted articles, respectively. 
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS  
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, there is a small observable deviation even 
before JBCM receive the award. It is possible that once they are approaching 
the John Bates Clark Medal age restriction (i.e., the age of 40), JBCM work 
more intensively, perhaps in the hope of receiving such recognition. Given 
that the award does not go to unknowns, their (perceived) chances must have 
already been quite high, which would in turn stimulate a performance boost 
within a relatively short timeframe before the award. In fact, the first Clark 
medalist, Paul Samuelson, in his “Chasing the Bitch Goddess of Success,” 
stresses the importance of earning professional recognition and respect: “Let 
me close with a few remarks on the motivation and rewards of scientists. 
Scientists are as avaricious and competitive as Smithian businessmen. The 
coin they seek is not apples, nuts, and yachts; nor is it the coin itself, or power 
as that term is ordinarily used. Scholars seek fame. The fame they seek, as I 
noted in my 1961 American Economic Association presidential address, is 
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fame with their peers—the other scientists whom they respect and whose 
respect they strive for. The sociologist Robert K. Merton has documented 
what I call this dirty little secret in his book The Sociology of Science. I am no 
exception. Abraham Lincoln’s law partner and biographer William Herndon 
observed that there was always a little clock of ambition ticking in the bosom 
of honest and whimsical Abe. No celebrity as a Newsweek columnist, no 
millions of clever-begotten speculative gains, no power as the Svengali or 
Rasputin to the prince and president could count as a pennyweight in my 
balance of worth against the prospect of recognition for having contributed to 
the empire of science” (Samuelson, 2004: 60). Merton himself cites Selye’s 
comments on such recognition: “Why is everybody so anxious to deny that he 
works for recognition?... All the scientists I know sufficiently well to judge 
(and I include myself in this group) are extremely anxious to have their work 
recognized and approved by others. Is it not below the dignity of an objective 
scientific mind to permit such a distortion of his true motives? Besides, what 
is there to be ashamed of?” (Merton, 1973: 341). 
 
B. Citation Counts per Publication 
In this section, we examine the effect of receiving the John Bates Clark Medal 
on citation success. In line with Azoulay, Stuart, and Wang (2011), we assess 
whether there is a significant difference between the treatment and control 
group in post-award citation counts per publication for publications that were 
published before the award was received. Exploring only published articles 
before the award allows us to isolate a potential "Matthew" effect. By using 
citation counts per publication, we can assess the average perceived impact of 
a scholar’s work without the effect being subject to the upward bias of 
receiving more citations from publishing more articles. To construct the 
synthetic control group based on publication quality, we use the pre-award 
number of journal pages and the citations per publication as performance 
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predictors, together with the debut year, PhD year, and PhD ranking of the 
researcher.  
 
FIGURE 2: CITATIONS PER PUBLICATION 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: DIFFERENCE IN CITATIONS PER PUBLICATION  
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Figure 2 shows the average citation counts for articles published before the 
Clark Medal was received. Figure 3 shows the individual differences between 
JBCM and the synthetic group8 from ten years before to ten years after the 
award year. The dotted line shows the standard error of the differences among 
groups. As expected, receiving the John Bates Clark Medal has a positive and 
long-lasting effect on the citation counts of pre-award publications. We note in 
Figures 2 and 3 that the citation paths evolve similarly for both groups and the 
difference between the groups is very close to zero in the pre-award period, 
indicating a close match in the pre-award quality measure. The citation path 
then diverges once JBCM experience the status change at year 0. On average, 
JBCM receive 18.35 citations for each article published before the award at 
year 5, and 32.12 at year 10, while the synthetic control group has only 12.27 
and 18.1 citations per pre-award publication at years 5 and 10. In other words, 
compared to the synthetic control group, five and ten years after receiving the 
                                                
8 Since the difference in SC1 and SC2 is not statistically significant, we only report SC1 from 
here onwards (t=0.02), for example, the cumulative citation counts at year 10 are equal to 
18.09 and 18.14 respectively.  
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award, JBCM receive 6.08 and 14.02 more citations, respectively, for any 
article they had published before receiving the award. As Figure 3 shows, the 
divergence rate function of the two curves is relatively linear, with an average 
post-award slope of 1.39 after being horizontal beforehand. This means that, 
on average, the gap between the citations received by JBCM and the synthetic 
control group grows by 1.39 weighted citations per post-award year. 
 
 
TABLE 2: DIFFERENCES IN POST-AWARD CITATIONS PER PUBLICATION  
 
Post-
Award 
Years JBC SC 
Value 
Diff. 
Relative 
Diff. N t-statistic 
11 31.16 18.24 12.92 1.94 26 3.54 
12 33.58 19.28 14.30 1.95 26 3.54 
13 34.16 18.77 15.39 2.03 25 3.25 
14 36.74 19.76 16.98 2.11 25 3.22 
15 37.32 20.47 16.86 2.13 24 2.90 
16 39.88 21.40 18.48 2.15 24 2.87 
17 42.14 21.93 20.21 2.25 23 2.73 
18 45.11 22.72 22.39 2.35 23 2.72 
19 48.43 21.92 26.51 2.70 22 2.78 
20 51.98 22.59 29.39 3.07 22 2.73 
Average   19.34 2.27   
 
 
Rather than reporting further figures in which we extend the timeframe after 
the award, we present in Table 2 an overview of ten figures on post-award 
differences in citations per pre-award publication. Increasing the post-award 
period (from 11 to 20 years) shows the difference between the control and 
treatment groups in the later time periods. This extension of the post-award 
period reduces the number of medalists that can be included in the analysis. In 
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all ten cases, the difference between the control group and the treatment group 
is statistically significant. The gap between both groups grows when exploring 
later post-award years, reaching the largest relative difference 19 years after 
the award (3.07 times more citations for JBCM). These numbers are a strong 
indicator of a status or "Matthew" effect.  
In Figure 4, we show that the absolute difference in citations per pre-
award publication is higher for JBCM in the time period between 1977 and 
2001 (Panel B) than in the period between 1947 and 1975 (Panel A). In Panel 
A, the citation gap ten years after receiving the award is only 4.38, whereas for 
the more recent JBCM, the gap equals 24.42. This increase in the gap between 
the control group and the JBCM is in line with a generally much higher level 
of citations in the second period. This explains why the relative difference is 
larger for the period between 1947 and 1975. In year 10, JBCM have a 81% 
higher citation rate than the synthetic group in Panel A and 76.9% in Panel B. 
Interestingly, Piatti (2012) shows that the citation inequality among papers in 
AER decreased in the last 60 years. Such a result is consistent with our 
findings.  
Panel A also shows that the citation counts for JBCM are 2.28 times 
higher than the synthetic control group in year 25. Thus, the gap remains 
considerable. The “visibility function” of awards could be crucial in 
explaining this stark contrast between treatment and control groups. Academia 
is faced with a “battle of attention” due to an immoderate number of papers 
produced per year. Since the sheer number of researchers and articles make it 
difficult to assess quality, awards can assume an important signaling function 
(Frey and Gallus, 2013). The copious output could lead scholars to rely on 
simple heuristics for information gathering and might explain why economists 
are attracted by the fame of JBCM.  
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FIGURE 4: CITATIONS PER PUBLICATION BY PERIOD9 
PANEL A: 1947–1975 JBCM 
 
PANEL B: 1977–2001 JBCM 
 
                                                
9 One should recall that the John Bates Clark Medal was awarded biennially from 1947 to 
2009. Therefore, 1976 was not an award year.  
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6. Robustness Check 
In this section, we assess the robustness of our main results by varying the 
measurement proxy and the method by which we select the control group. 
First, we use the weighted number of journal pages as the measure of 
productivity instead of the publication head  counts. We find that the relative 
page difference between the synthetic control group and treatment group over 
the post-award period is not significantly different from relative publication 
difference (t=0.84). For instance, after 10 years JBMC publish 1.22 times 
more pages than the control group which is similar to the reported relative 
publication performance (1.25 times more publications). Then, we limit the 
control group to only Fellows of the Econometric Society (ES). Nearly 900 
(899) individuals have so far been awarded fellowship (for an overview, see 
Chan and Torgler, 2012). All John Bates Clark Medal recipients have been 
elected as Fellows of the ES (except Kenneth E. Boulding and Emmanuel 
Saez). Most JBCM have been appointed as Fellows before obtaining the 
Medal. We are able to use data of 858 Fellows to build the synthetic group. 
We rely solely on the debut year and the pre-treatment citation and publication 
performance (without controlling for the quality of the education received). 
The results using both measurements (cumulative publication counts and 
citations per publication) are reported in Appendix B2. Compared to the 
previous results, we observe a smaller gap between the JBCM and the ES 
synthetic control group. For example, in year 10, the difference in the number 
of publications between the ES synthetic control group and the JBCM is 1.52 
(weighted) articles instead of 2.46 (previous synthetic group). A small 
reduction in the gap can also be found for citations per publication (from 
14.03 to 10.1).  
 
7. Conclusion 
Awarding prizes, medals, and trophies has a long history. Science, along with 
many other institutions, has developed a system to allocate rewards to those 
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who excel. This paper investigates whether the John Bates Clark Medal, the 
preeminent token of recognition among American economists below the age 
of 40, raises the subsequent research activity and citation-based status of 
award recipients (the treatment group) compared to non-recipient scholars 
with similar previous research performance (the control group). Specifically, 
we construct a group of “synthetic” counterfactuals (see Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2003) to the John Bates Clark medalists using a weighted 
combination of non-recipient researchers that best resemble the pre-award 
academic lifecycle of the corresponding medalists. We are thus able to 
distinguish whether receiving the Clark Medal merely reflects the activity of 
particularly gifted young economists or whether it actually raises scholarly 
productivity and status.  
We find that the latter is indeed the case—and to a considerable 
degree. Our results indicate a positive effect on productivity after receiving the 
award. We also note a strong post-award citation gap that shows no sign of 
diminishing over time. On average, at five years after the award conferral, 
Clark medalists have 1.92 more weighted publications than the synthetic 
control group. Furthermore, Clark medalists attract 18.35 citations per 
publication, whereas the control group attracts 12.27, demonstrating a 
difference of 6.08 citations per pre-award publication. After another five 
years, the difference in weighted publications has grown to 2.46, whereas the 
gap in citations per article amounts to 14.02. Ten years after the award 
conferral, Clark medalists and the synthetic control group respectively attract 
32.12 and 18.1 citations per publication on all articles published before the 
award.  
Assuming that, at the time of the Clark Medal's conferral, recipients 
and the control group had the same number of publications (17.7), after five 
years, a recipient on average accumulates 325 citations for these publications, 
i.e. 50% more than the synthetic control group with 217 citations. Ten years 
after conferral of the Clark Medal, the recipients have 569 citations on those 
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same publications, compared to 320 citations for the synthetic control group. 
This is a difference of no less than 78%. We conjecture that awards, in 
general, tend to raise productivity, as well as attract more attention from peers.  
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Appendix A 
 
TABLE A1: JOURNAL CONTENT 
      
Journal Year established 
(first year 
available) 
Number of 
articles 
Number of 
unique 
authors 
Number 
of 
articles 
per 
available 
years 
Number 
of 
authors 
per 
available 
years 
American Economic Review 1911 6313 5580 61.89 54.71 
Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 
1970 3388 2645 42.35 33.06 
Econometric Theory 1985 (1988) 3535 2643 80.34 60.07 
Econometrica 1933 4737 3794 41.55 33.28 
Economic Journal 1900 2706 2406 34.25 30.46 
Games and Economic Behavior 1989 (1991) 3892 3258 34.14 28.58 
International Economic Review 1960* 1928 1845 52.11 49.86 
Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics 
1983 (1985) 2894 2599 87.70 78.76 
Journal of Econometrics 1973 (1980) 4480 4010 66.87 59.85 
Journal of Economic Literature 1963 (1969) 1689 1753 73.43 76.22 
Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 
1987 (1988) 1922 2131 51.95 57.59 
Journal of Economic Theory 1969 1633 1716 39.83 41.85 
Journal of Finance 1946 640 559 15.24 13.31 
Journal of Financial Economics 1974 (1976) 1284 942 51.36 37.68 
Journal of Law and Economics 1958 4237 3682 37.50 32.58 
Journal of Monetary Economics 1976 1958 2210 46.62 52.62 
Journal of Political Economy 1892 (1899) 1171 1620 41.82 57.86 
Journal of Public Economics 1976 624 717 14.18 16.30 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1886 (1899) 1132 1281 45.28 51.24 
RAND Journal of Economics 1970 1113 1235 20.61 22.87 
Review of Economic Studies 1933 2820 2989 76.22 80.78 
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Review of Economics and 
Statistics 
1919 4410 4705 67.85 72.38 
Review of Financial Studies 1988 (1990) 1184 1545 51.48 67.17 
Note: Besides the missing records for the first few years of certain journals, Web of Science 
does not have records for International Economic Review for the period between 1966 and 
1976. Additionally, we exclude American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. These 
missing data do create some problems in our analysis. For example, one John Bates Clark 
medalist, Daniel L. McFadden, the recipient in 1975, has two articles in the Journal of Public 
Economics in 1974 that are not recorded in our dataset, which might give a false reflection of 
the medalist’s true quality, and therefore create an inappropriate/inaccurate synthetic control 
group. 
 
 
TABLE A2: JOURNAL RANKINGS AND ASSOCIATED QUALITY ADJUSTMENT 
INDEX 
Journal 
KY 
(2006)  
KMS 
(2011) 
CCOD 
(forthcomi
ng) 
LP 
(1984) 
PHV 
(2004) 
Ritzberger 
(2008) 
KS 
(2010) 
Simple 
average 
# of 
appearanc
es in top 
10 
ranking 
American Economic 
Review 
1 1 1 1 0.759 0.361 0.964 0.869 7 
Econometrica 0.799 0.448 0.968 0.64 1 1 0.993 0.835 7 
Journal of Economic 
Theory 
0.421 0.225 0.588 0.226 0.344 0.346 0.934 0.441 7 
Journal of Political 
Economy 
0.746 0.414 0.652 0.809 0.669 0.513 1 0.686 7 
Review of Economic 
Studies 
0.404 0.327 0.452 0.225 0.643 0.530 0.961 0.506 7 
Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
0.884 0.596 0.581 0.001 0.988 0.724 0.982 0.679 6 
Journal of Monetary 
Economics 
0.333 0.278 0.364 0.23 0.461 0.379 0.857 0.415 5 
Journal of Econometrics 0.359 0.162 0.549 0.16 0.212 0.260 0.840 0.363 4 
Journal of Finance 0.987 . . 0.174 . 0.383 . 0.515 3 
Games and Economic 
Behavior 
0.226 0.120 0.355 . 0.326 0.212 0.609 0.308 2 
 38 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
0.787 0.157 0.099 . 0.150 0.310 0.930 0.406 2 
RAND Journal of 
Economics 
0.205 0.130 0.114 . 0.201 0.141 0.913 0.284 2 
Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 
0.135 0.051 . . . . 0.939 0.375 1 
Econometric Theory 0.115 0.036 0.459 0.118 0.564 0.161  0.242 1 
Economic Journal 0.248 0.208 0.207 0.168 0.858 0.119 0.096 0.272 1 
International Economic 
Review 
0.266 0.124 0.230 0.394 0.856 0.156 0.190 0.317 1 
Journal of Business & 
Economic Statistics 
0.176 0.069 0.384 0.177 0.786 . . 0.318 1 
Journal of Economic 
Literature 
0.354 0.183 0.188 . 0.864 0.786 . 0.475 1 
Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 
0.318 0.192 0.343 . 0.894 . . 0.437 1 
Journal of Law and 
Economics 
0.056 0.035 0.039 0.112 0.913 . . 0.231 1 
Journal of Public 
Economics 
0.247 0.222 0.198 0.171 0.753 0.163 0.121 0.268 1 
Review of Economics 
and Statistics 
0.315 0.242 0.280 0.201 0.911 0.163 0.115 0.318 1 
Review of Financial 
Studies 
0.480 . . 0.304 . . . 0.392 1 
Note: We standardize the indices by dividing all values by the highest score (see Koczy & 
Strobel, 2010; Palacios-Huerta & Volij, 2004), so that the highest-quality journal receives a 
value of 1. 
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TABLE A3: RANKING METHODS 
 
Ranking Index Reference Index title 
LP Method  
Kodrzycki & Yu (2006) p.22-27, table 2, 
column 1 
Within Economics Impact 
Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas & 
Stengos (2011) 
p.1530, table 1, 
column 2 
Citation/Article Index 
Liebowitz and Palmer 
(1984) 
p.80-81, table 1, 
column 3 
Rankings Based on Impact Adjusted 
Citations to Articles Published 1975-
1979 
Conley et al. (forthcoming) p.32, table A.3  
Invariant method 
Palacios-Huerta & Volij 
(2004) 
p.972, table 1, 
column 1 
Invariant Method 
Ritzberger (2008) p.413-418, table 1, 
column 1 
Value 
Tournament method 
Koczy & Strobel (2010) 
 
p.13-19, table 1  
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TABLE A4: JOHN BATES CLARK MEDALISTS 
John Bates Clark Medalists Year Awarded Year of Birth 
Paul A Samuelson 1947 1915 
Kenneth E. Boulding 1949 1910 
Milton Friedman 1951 1912 
James Tobin 1955 1918 
Kenneth J. Arrow 1957 1921 
Lawrence R. Klein 1959 1920 
Robert M. Solow 1961 1924 
Hendrik S. Houthakker 1963 1924 
Zvi Griliches 1965 1930 
Gary S. Becker 1967 1930 
Marc Nerlove 1969 1933 
Dale W. Jorgenson 1971 1933 
Franklin M. Fisher 1973 1934 
Daniel L. McFadden 1975 1937 
Martin S. Feldstein 1977 1939 
Joseph E. Stiglitz 1979 1943 
A. Michael Spence 1981 1943 
James J. Heckman 1983 1944 
Jerry A. Hausman 1985 1946 
Sanford J. Grossman 1987 1953 
David M. Kreps 1989 1950 
Paul R. Krugman 1991 1953 
Lawrence H. Summers 1993 1954 
David Card 1995 1956 
Kevin M. Murphy 1997 1958 
Andrei Shleifer 1999 1961 
Matthew Rabin 2001 1963 
Notes:  The list of all the John Bates Clark medalists is provided by the American 
Economic Association, see http://www.aeaweb.org/honors_awards/clark_medal.php. 
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 TABLE A5: SYNTHETIC CONTROL GROUP FOR ANDREI SHLEIFER 
Name Weight PhD Institution 
PhD 
Year 
Year of 
Birth 
Andrei Shleifer 
 
MIT 1986 1961 
N. Gregory 
Mankiw 0.252 MIT 1984 1958 
Kenneth S. Rogoff 0.198 MIT 1980 1953 
Jean Tirole 0.197 MIT 1981 1953 
Donald W. K. 
Andrews 0.132 
University of California, 
Berkeley 1982 1955 
Julio J. Rotemberg 0.109 Princeton University 1981 1953 
R. Preston 
McAfee 0.083 Purdue University 1980 1956 
Carl Shapiro 0.029 MIT 1981 1955 
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Appendix B 
FIGURE B1: ANDREI SHLEIFER AND HIS SYNTHETIC CONTROL UNIT 
 
 
FIGURE B2: NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS AND CITATIONS PER PUBLICATION 
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